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“Immigration policy shapes the destiny of the Nation . . . . The his-
tory of the United States is in part made of the stories, talents, and 
lasting contributions of those who crossed oceans and deserts to 
come here.” 
–Justice Anthony Kennedy, Arizona v. United States
1
 
“A dream you dream alone is only a dream. A dream you dream to-






In 2011, Maria Gomez earned her master’s degree in architecture 
and urban design.
3
 This is an outstanding achievement for any student. 
For Maria, it was the result of the same hard work and diligence she had 
practiced since her days as a middle-school honor student, when she first 
knew that she wanted to become an architect. 
In high school, Maria excelled in community service, extracurricu-
lar, and school leadership activities.
4
 She graduated tenth in her class 
with a 3.9 GPA and was accepted by every college to which she applied.
5
 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2014; B.A., Cultural Anthropology, Western 
Washington University, 2006. My appreciation to Professor Won Kidane and my colleagues at Seat-
tle University Law Review for your assistance in the development of this Comment. To husband and 
my family: I thank you so much for your encouragement, support, and love. 
 1. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012). 
 2. While this quote was made famous by and is often attributed to John Lennon, it was actually 
written by Yoko Ono. See DAVID SHEFF, ALL WE ARE SAYING: THE LAST MAJOR INTERVIEW WITH 
JOHN LENNON AND YOKO ONO 16 (St. Martins 2000). 
 3. 158 CONG. REC. S5072–01 (July 17, 2012) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (introducing Maria 
Gomez’ story to Congress in support of Dream Act legislation.). 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
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But she faced an obstacle most of her classmates did not: she was ineli-
gible for financial aid because she did not have a social security number.
6
 
In fact, Maria had no legal status at all. She was brought to the United 
States as a child from Mexico without any documentation.
7




Maria’s lifelong goal was to become an architect; however, she 
couldn’t afford to attend the University of California at Berkeley—the 
only state college in California with an undergraduate architecture pro-
gram.
9
 Instead, she chose to attend the University of California at Los 
Angeles (UCLA) while living at home and riding the bus two and a half 
hours each way to school every day, cleaning houses and babysitting to 
cover her tuition as a full-time student.
 10
 Despite the great adversity she 




When Maria finally enrolled in the Master of Architecture Program 
at UCLA, the long and hard-earned road to her future did not get much 
easier. She continued to struggle financially, eating at the school food 
bank and sleeping many nights on the floor of the school’s printing 
room.
12




Upon graduation, Maria faced yet another obstacle that her col-
leagues did not: she could not work in her newfound profession. She was 
still without legal status in the United States and therefore could not le-
gally work in any job. Employment authorization is the key that turns in 
motion the dream that Maria and so many others have worked so hard to 
achieve: 
I grew up believing in the American dream and I worked hard to 
earn my place in the country that nurtured and educated 
me . . . . Like the thousands of other undocumented students and 
graduates across America, I am looking for one thing, and one thing 
only: the opportunity to give back to my community, my state, and 
the country that is my home, the United States.
14
 
                                                          
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id; see infra Part II.A. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. 
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On June 15, 2012, President Obama made an announcement that 
changed the lives of millions
15
 of qualified DREAMers like Maria.
16
 Ef-
fective immediately, the Obama administration would implement a new 
program—what would come to be known as Deferred Action for Child-
hood Arrivals (DACA)—offering eligible DREAMers both a two-year 
respite from the haunting possibility of deportation as well as the eligibil-
ity to apply for employment authorization.
17
 Having employment author-
ization not only allows DREAMers the ability to work legally in the 
United States, but also qualifies them to apply for a social security num-
ber.
18
 A social security number is an essential element to life in the Unit-
ed States today: it opens the door to a bank account, certain student 
loans, credit cards, a driver’s license, a cell phone plan, and countless 
other aspects of everyday living that most of us take for granted and 
would struggle enormously without. 
While millions were elated by the President’s announcement, he al-
so faced harsh criticism. Many claimed that his action exceeded federal 
statutory limits, exceeded his Executive powers, and usurped congres-
sional authority. Still others, anxious to see comprehensive immigration 
reform implemented, were disappointed that he had not gone further.
19
 
This Comment will address both criticisms before concluding that 
DACA is within the President’s power as a form of prosecutorial discre-
tion and that the attendant grant of employment authorization is neces-
sarily within the scope of that power. Part II of this Comment outlines 
the development of prosecutorial discretion in the law and reviews the 
scope of judicial review over agency decision-making. It then discusses 
the history and use of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law specif-
ically and summarizes administrative guidance regarding prosecutorial 
discretion in the immigration context. Part III outlines the DREAM Act 
and DACA, explores the criticisms of DACA, and evaluates the statutory 
and constitutional limits of the Executive Branch authority. Part IV ad-
dresses comprehensive immigration reform and discusses how DACA is 
                                                          
 15. See Jeffery S. Passel & Mark Hugo Lopez, Up to 1.7 Million Unauthorized Immigrant 
Youth May Benefit from New Deportation Rules, PEW HISP. CENTER (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/12/unauthroized_immigrant_youth_update.pdf. 
 16. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (Jun. 15, 2012), avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration. 
 17. Id. 
 18. SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER—DEFERRED ACTION FOR 
CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS, available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/deferred_action.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2013) 
 19. See infra Part III. 
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likely to influence that reform. Part V briefly summarizes, reflects, and 
concludes. 
II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW:                             
A BACKGROUND 
This Section describes the history and scope of prosecutorial discre-
tion. Part II.A introduces and defines the major terminology used 
throughout this Comment. Part II.B outlines the role of prosecutorial dis-
cretion outside of the immigration context while Part II.C tracks the role 
and use of prosecutorial discretion within immigration law. 
A. Definitions 
The DREAM Act is a piece of bipartisan legislation that, if passed, 
would allow undocumented youth who arrived in the United States as 
children to earn legal status.
20
 “DREAMer” is the term used to describe 
those youth.
21
 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), enacted in 
1952 and amended frequently since then, is the primary federal statute 
governing immigration law;
22
 it is now hundreds of pages long.
23
 The 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was the federal agency 
that oversaw U.S. immigration law until 2003,
24
 and the term is used in 
this Comment when referring to memoranda released and cases that were 
adjudicated under its authority. Its functions included inspection, en-
forcement, and administrative duties.
25
 The INS was replaced in 2003 by 
                                                          
 20. See Luis Miranda, The Dream Act: Good for Our Economy, Good for Our Security, Good 
for Our Nation, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Dec. 01, 2010, 7:19 PM), http://www.white 
house.gov/blog/2010/12/01/get-facts-dream-act. 
 21. See Julia Preston, A ‘Dreamer’ Addresses the Democratic Convention, THE CAUCUS, THE 
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT BLOG OF THE TIMES (Sept. 6, 2012, 12:44 PM), http://thecaucus. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/a-dreamer-addresses-the-democratic-convention/; see also David A. 
Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris 
Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L. J. ONLINE 167, 167–68 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-
yale-law-journal-pocket-part/executive-power/a-defense-of-immigration%11enforcementdiscretion:-
the-legal-and-policy-flaws-in-kris-kobach’s-latest-crusade/.  
 22. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012) [hereinafter INA]; see 
also Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/ (follow “Laws” hyperlink, then follow “Immigration and 
Nationality Act” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 29, 2013). “Created in 1952, the INA stands alone as a 
body of law, but it is also contained in Title 8 of the United States Code . . . Although it is correct to 
refer to a specific section by either its INA citation or its U.S. code, the INA citation is more com-
monly used.” Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., supra; see 
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1 
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 5th ed. 2009). 
 23. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 22, at 1. 
 24. See id. at 3. 
 25. See id. 
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the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a cabinet department 
which now oversees all immigration matters through three agencies: 
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (ICE), and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS).
26
 ICE is currently the agency in charge of enforcing our na-
tion’s immigration laws within our nation’s borders.
27
 The term “prose-
cutorial discretion” is used to refer generally to a law enforcement or 
administrative agency’s authority to decide whether to pursue charges 
against a person.
28
 “Deferred action” is a form of prosecutorial discretion 
in the immigration context, referring to the discretionary decision to not 
pursue removal against a person—usually based on equitable and hu-
manitarian factors.
29
 “Alien” is a term of art defined by the INA as “any 
person not a citizen or national of the United States,”
30
 which therefore 
includes those with legal status, as well as those without legal status.
31
 
Other terms are defined throughout the text. 
B. A Short History of Prosecutorial Discretion Outside of the             
Immigration Context 
The prosecutor’s broad discretion in deciding who and when to 
prosecute—or, alternatively, not to prosecute—is a principle deeply en-
trenched in American criminal law.
32
 One of the major reasons behind 
prosecutorial discretion is the practical reality of a finite availability of 
resources.
33
 To deny a prosecutor the authority to exercise discretion 
without having the resources to prosecute every offense has been likened 
to “directing a general to attack the enemy on all fronts at once.”
34
 Ra-
                                                          
 26. DHS was formed pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA). Id. at 2–3. In 
addition to dissolving the INS, the HSA brought some twenty-two federal agencies under the new 
single umbrella of the DHS. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 266 (2010). 
 29. See id. at 245. 
 30. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(3) (2012). 
 31. See id. Because of the inaccurate and stereotypical connotations carried by the term, this 
Comment will only use the word “alien” in direct quotations; “noncitizen” will be used elsewhere. 
“‘Noncitizen’ conveys essentially the same technical meaning” as the statutory definition of “alien.” 
LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 22, at 1. For these same reasons, “illegal” will be replaced 
with “undocumented.” 
 32. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 4 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2(a) (3d ed. 2012). 
 33. See id. Within the immigration context, the financial impossibility of enforcing every pos-
sible removal is discussed in Part III.C.2, infra. 
 34. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 32 (citing T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 153 
(1935)). 
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ther, “the prosecutor must remain free to exercise his judgment in deter-
mining what prosecutions will best serve the public interest.”
35
 
Within the realm of agency decision-making, the Supreme Court 
has maintained a general presumption against judicial reviewability of 
prosecutorial discretion going back to the nineteenth century.
36
 The 
Court made a short departure from precedent in the 1960s when it began 
to uphold judicial review of prosecutorial discretion, a transition attribut-
ed to the 1946 enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
37 
which established a framework for the promulgation and enforcement of 
regulations by federal agencies.
38
 However, this trend was short lived; in 
1975, the Court signaled a return to its earlier presumption against re-
viewability of agency decision-making in Dunlop v. Bachowski.
39
 The 
Dunlop Court held that judicial review of an agency’s decision not to act 
is limited to the deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard under 
APA § 706(2)(A).
40
 Ten years later, the Court made a full and clear re-
turn to a presumption against reviewability in Heckler v. Chaney, holding 
that “an agency’s decision not to take enforcement action is presumed 
immune from judicial review under [APA] § 701(a)(2).”
41
 The Court 
explained its rationale with the following: 
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated 
balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its ex-
pertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation 
has occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this 
violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it 
acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits 
                                                          
 35. Id. 
 36. Wadhia, supra note 28, at 286 (citing RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE 1252 (4th ed. 2002)). The Court first recognized an exception to the general presumption 
against judicial reviewability of agency decision-making in the landmark 1886 decision of Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins, which was “based on a claim that the agency’s selective enforcement of an ordinance 
against two hundred Chinese (and zero non-Chinese) was racially motivated.” Wadhia, supra note 
28, at 287. There, the Court held that a facially race-neutral law may still violate the Equal Protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it is administered prejudicially. See Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 37. Wadhia, supra note 28, at 287; Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 
(1946) (codified as amended 5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq). 
 38. JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 580–603 
(Foundation Press ed., 2010). The APA was passed as a source of procedural law for federal admin-
istrative agencies; a legislative compromise following a lengthy political struggle over executive 
agencies. Id. However, it is not the exclusive source of procedural law for federal administrative 
agencies; the Constitution, other statutory provisions, and the agency’s own regulations also impose 
constraints. Id. 
 39. 421 U.S. 560 (1975). 
 40. Id. at 566. 
 41. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). 
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the agency’s overall policies, and indeed, whether the agency has 
enough resources to undertake the action at all. An agency generally 
cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is 
charged with enforcing. The agency is far better equipped than the 
courts to deal with the many variables involved.
42
 
The reasons espoused by the Court to support a presumption against 
judicial review of an agency’s decision not to enforce are rooted in one 
of the bedrock purposes of prosecutorial discretion in criminal law previ-
ously mentioned: finite resources. Like criminal prosecutors, administra-
tive agencies simply do not have the resources available to enforce every 
violation. Just as criminal prosecutors must make a threshold decision 
regarding whether they have the evidence to prosecute a crime and 
whether their limited resources are best spent prosecuting that specific 
crime over another, so too must agencies assess which violations best 
justify the use of their limited enforcement resources. These decisions 
are based on factors that the agency—rather than a court—knows best. 
C. Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law:                                 
Historical Development 
Within the immigration context, prosecutorial discretion is a tre-
mendous power, one that “affects the fate of more noncitizens than any 
other government action.”
43
 For some, it may be the only relief available 
from deportation.
44
 In 1889, the Court in Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States held for the first time that the Government has plenary power to 
regulate immigration.
45
 Although this great power does not emanate from 
any specific constitutional provision, the Court reasoned that the power 
to exclude foreigners was an inherent incident of a nation’s sovereign-
ty.
46
 Furthermore, it held—carving out a large exception to Marbury v. 
Madison
47
—that the immigration laws Congress chooses to pass are not 
                                                          
 42. Id. at 831–32; see also Administration Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1) (2012). In 2004, 
the Court in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance went even further: it held that a claim 
under APA § 706(1) “can only proceed where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a dis-
crete agency action that it is required to take.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 
64 (2004). 
 43. Wadhia, supra note 28, at 246. 
 44. MARY KENNEY, LEGAL ACTION CENTER, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION: HOW TO ADVOCATE FOR YOUR CLIENT 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.ailawebcle.org/resources/Resources%20for%208-24-11%20Seminar.pdf. 
 45. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 46. See id. at 603–05, 607, 609. 
 47. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding that the Supreme Court has the power 
to review acts of the other branches of government to determine their constitutionality). 
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reviewable by any court.
48
 In stark terms, “[t]he bottom line of the plena-
ry power doctrine may be that Congress could expel all or any class of 
resident aliens whenever it wants without judicial opposition.”
49
 Howev-
er, there is some restraint; “since the 1970s, the Court has modified this 




Although plenary power over immigration remains with the Legis-
lature, Congress conferred discretion to the Administrative Branch to 
suspend deportation as far back as 1940.
51
 Later, under the INA, Con-
gress delegated to the Executive Branch the authority to enforce the im-
migration laws.
52
 While this delegation of authority does not give the 
Executive Branch the authority to decide who is removable, it does dele-
gate practically unbridled authority to the Executive Branch to determine 
whether to pursue removal,
53
 for the practical reasons discussed in Part 
II.B. 
The application of prosecutorial discretion to the immigration con-
text did not become public until a series of cases involving the deporta-
tion of the musician John Lennon.
54
 Prior to his deportation proceedings, 
“the nonpriority program was a secret operation of the INS.”
55
 John Len-
non and Yoko Ono were initially admitted to the United States on 
                                                          
 48. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606. 
 49. Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 620 (2006). 
 50. Id. at 619 (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 
(1972)). 
 51. Neuman, supra note 49, at 622 (“Prior to 1940, the primary curative instrument for pre-
venting the break-up of families by deportation in sympathetic cases was the private immigration 
bill, enacted by Congress for the relief of named individuals.” (citing BERNADETTE 
MAGUIRE, IMMIGRATION: PUBLIC LEGISLATION AND PRIVATE BILLS 20–23, 89–90 (1997))). Id. 
 52. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 103(a) (2012); Letter from Hiroshi Motomura, et al., to 
President Barack Obama (May 28, 2012), available at www.nilc.org/document.html?id=754 (citing 
§ 103(a)). 
 53. INA § 237(a)(1)(A) (“Any alien who at the time of entry [was] . . . inadmissible by the law 
existing at such time is deportable.”); § 237(a)(1)(B) (“Any alien who is present in the United States 
in violation of this Act [which includes those who have overstayed their visas] . . . is deportable.”) 
(emphasis added); see also Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration 
Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 513 (2009) (citing § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) (“An alien present in the United States 
without being admitted or paroled . . . is inadmissible.”)).  
 54. Lennon v. Richardson, 378 F. Supp. 39, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Lennon, 15 I. & N. Dec. 9 
(BIA 1974) vacated by Lennon v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975). 
For those few who may not be aware, John Lennon was one of the four members of the Beatles, an 
anti-war activist and adversary of the Nixon administration, and was famously shot to death outside 
his New York City apartment building in 1980. Biography, JOHN LENNON, http://www.johnlennon. 
com/biography (last visited Aug. 29, 2013). 
 55. Wadhia, supra note 28, at 246 (citing Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information 
Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42 (1976–77)). 
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nonimmigrant visas,
56
 and Lennon was later placed in deportation pro-
ceedings for overstaying his temporary visa.
57
 An immigration judge ad-
justed Ono’s status to that of a legal permanent resident
58
 but found that 
because Lennon had been convicted in England for possession of “can-
nabis resin,”
59
 he was deportable as a matter of law.
60
 Lennon asserted 
that it was the practice of INS to decline prosecution in cases involving 
circumstances similar to his
61
 and that the Nixon administration was only 
targeting him because of his political beliefs and potential to become a 
leader in the anti-war movement.
62
 Lennon sought INS records relevant 
to a “nonpriority” category of cases and the standards used in determin-
ing its applicability, believing the records would both confirm the agency 
practice and reveal his eligibility for relief.
63
 He eventually obtained the 
records under the Freedom of Information Act,
64
 and as a consequence, 
the INS finally made public the existence and details of its nonpriority 
program.
65
 Although Lennon was eventually granted a green card—
mooting the question of his nonpriority status—his Second Circuit case 
                                                          
 56. Upon arrival, Lennon was found excludable under INA § 212(a)(23), but applied for and 
received a waiver under § 212(d)(3)(a). 
 57. Wadhia, supra note 28, at 246. 
 58. Lennon and Ono filed third preference petitions, a visa given to qualified “immigrants 
who . . . because of their exceptional ability in the sciences or the arts will substantially benefit pro-
spectively the national economy, cultural interests, or welfare of the United States.” Lennon, 527 
F.2d at 189; INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(i). The application can be a challenge to Lennon’s classification as 
an excludable noncitizen. Lennon, 527 F.2d at 189. 
 59. Lennon, 15 I. & N. Dec. 9, 25 (BIA 1974). “[Lennon] contends that his conviction does not 
place him within the exclusion provision of section 212(a)(23) because (1) the British statute under 
which he was convicted did not require mens rea, and (2) cannabis resin is not ‘marihuana’ within 
the meaning of section 212(a)(23).” Id. at 17. 
 60. Lennon v. Richardson, 378 F. Supp. 39, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
 61. See Lennon, 15 I. & N. Dec. 9. 
 62. Biography, JOHN LENNON, http://www.johnlennon.com/biography (last visited Aug. 29, 
2013). 
 63. Wadhia, supra note 28, at 247. “Nonpriority” referred to a category of cases in which the 
INS will defer the departure of a noncitizen indefinitely and take no action to disturb his immigration 
status on the ground that such action “would be unconscionable because of the existence of appeal-
ing humanitarian factors.” Lennon, 378 F. Supp. at 41–42. Lennon’s asserted ground was that Ono 
“desired to remain in the United States to endeavor to locate and obtain custody of her child by a 
former marriage, and [Lennon] desired to remain with and assist her.” Id. at 41. 
 64. Administrative Procedure Act § 2, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 65. Wadhia, supra note 28, at 248 (citing Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information 
Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 47 (1976–77); Leon Wildes, The Deferred Action Program of the Bureau 
of Citizenship and Immigration Services: A Possible Remedy for Impossible Immigration Cases, 41 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 820 (2004)). 
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Prosecutorial discretion has since remained a significant and public 
part of the enforcement of our nation’s immigration laws, and with its 
exposure has come the question of judicial review over such agency de-
cisions. Prior to 1996, “judicial review of most administrative action un-
der the INA was governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a),” which directed that 
“‘the sole and exclusive procedure for . . . the judicial review of all final 
orders of deportation’ shall be that set forth in the Hobbs Act,
67
 which 
[gave] exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of appeals.”
68
 Then in 1996, 
Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon-
sibility Act (IIRIRA),
69
 which expressly restricted judicial review of the 
Attorney General’s “‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, ad-
judicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this 
Act.’”
70
 The Court noted that “many provisions of IIRIRA are aimed at 
protecting the Executive’s discretion from the courts—indeed, that can 
fairly be said to be the theme of the legislation.”
71
 Reno v. American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee outlined the common law, equity-
based development of deferred action as a form of prosecutorial discre-
tion in the immigration context: 
To ameliorate a harsh and unjust outcome, the INS may decline to 
institute proceedings, terminate proceedings, or decline to execute a 
final order of deportation. This commendable exercise in adminis-
trative discretion, developed without express statutory authoriza-
tion, originally was known as nonpriority
72
 and is now designated as 
deferred action treatment . . . . . Approval of deferred action status 
means that, for the humanitarian reasons . . . , no action will thereaf-
ter be taken to proceed against an apparently deportable alien, even 
on grounds normally regarded as aggravated.
73
 
Prior to IIRIRA, judicial review over decisions not to grant deferred 
action was largely unrestricted, allowing cases like Lennon—which were 
                                                          
 66. Id. (citing Lennon v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 527 F.2d 187, 191 n.7 (2d Cir. 
1975)). 
 67. 28 U.S.C. § 2341 et seq. 
 68. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 476 (1999) (citation omit-
ted).  
 69. 110 Stat. 3009-546. 
 70. Reno, 525 U.S. at 473 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1994 ed., Supp. III)). 
 71. Id. at 486 (emphasis in original).  
 72. A reference back to the Lennon cases. 
 73. Reno, 525 U.S. at 484 (citing C. GORDON, S. MAILMAN, & S. YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION 
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 72.03[2][h] (6th ed. 1998)). 
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based on selective-enforcement arguments—to be litigated on the basis 
of equal protection, due process, or abuse of discretion grounds.
74
 Post-
IIRIRA, in line with the legislation’s theme of limiting judicial review, 
even those decisions are now largely unreviewable.
75
 “INA Section 
242(g) [created under IIRIRA] bars judicial review of such decisions as 
whether to commence removal proceedings (a matter of generally unre-
viewable prosecutorial discretion) and whether to execute a removal or-
der (rather than stay temporary removal).”
76
 
D. ICE Guidance and Related Actions Regarding                              
Prosecutorial Discretion 
In recent years, the Executive Branch issued numerous memoranda 
regarding the authority of immigration officers to exercise prosecutorial 
discretion, with specific direction as to how that discretion should be ex-
ercised. 
On November 17, 2000, then-INS Commissioner Doris Meissner 
issued a memorandum entitled “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion” 
(Meissner Memo) in which she clearly articulated the role of prosecuto-
rial discretion in immigration enforcement.
77
 She instructed that “[a]s a 
general matter, it is better to exercise favorable discretion as early in the 
process as possible, once the relevant facts have been determined, in or-
der to conserve the Service’s resources and in recognition of the alien’s 
interest in avoiding unnecessary legal proceedings.”
78
 The memorandum 
also directed that “field agents and officers are not only authorized by 
law to exercise discretion within the authority of the agency, but are ex-
pected to do so in a judicious manner at all stages of the enforcement 
process.”
79
 The Meissner Memo remains in use today and is the founda-
                                                          
 74. Reno, 525 U.S. at 484–85. 
 75. Id. at 485–86 (“Section 1252(g) seems clearly designed to give some measure of protection 
to ‘no deferred action’ decisions and similar discretionary determinations, providing that if they are 
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 76. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 22, at 769. 
 77. See IMMIGRATION POL’Y CENTER, UNDERSTANDING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN 
IMMIGRATION LAW (2011) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION], available 
at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/IPC_Prosecutorial_Discretion_090911 
_FINAL.pdf. 
 78. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., to 
Reg’l Dirs., Dist. Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents, Reg’l & Dist. Counsel 6 (Nov. 17, 2000), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/22092970/INS-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-DorisMeissne 
r-11-7-00. 
 79. Id. at 1. 
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On October 24, 2005, William Howard, Principal Legal Advisor for 
ICE, released a memorandum simply entitled “Prosecutorial Discretion,” 
emphasizing the critical importance of prosecutorial discretion in manag-
ing the overwhelming workload faced by ICE.
81
 Noting that “the uni-
verse of opportunities to exercise prosecutorial discretion is large,” How-
ard urged: “It is important that we all apply sound principles of prosecu-
torial discretion, uniformly throughout our offices and in all of our cases, 
to ensure that the cases we litigate on behalf of the United States . . . are 
truly worth litigating.”
82
 He closed by neatly summarizing both the hu-
man and economic importance of prosecutorial discretion in the immi-
gration context: 
Prosecutorial discretion is a very significant tool that sometimes en-
ables you to deal with the difficult, complex and contradictory pro-
visions of the immigration laws and cases involving human suffer-
ing. It is clearly DHS policy that national security violators, human 
rights abusers, spies, traffickers in both narcotics and people, sexual 
predators and other criminals are removal priorities. It is wise to 
remember that cases that do not fall within these categories some-
times require that we balance the cost of an action versus the value 
of a result. Our reasoned determination in making prosecutorial dis-
cretion decisions can be a significant benefit to the efficiency and 
fairness of the removal process.
83
 
Five years later, on June 30, 2010, John Morton, then-Assistant 
Secretary of ICE, issued a memorandum to all ICE employees: “Civil 
Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, 
and Removal of Aliens.” In it, he emphasized ICE’s priority to focus its 
limited resources on “removal of aliens who pose a danger to national 
security or a risk to public safety.”
84
 He directed that “[t]he rapidly in-
creasing number of criminal aliens who may come to ICE’s attention 
heightens the need for ICE employees to exercise sound judgment and 
                                                          
 80. See IMMIGRATION POL’Y CENTER, UNDERSTANDING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION, supra 
note 77. 
 81. Memorandum from William Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration & Cus-
toms Enforcement, to all OPLA Chief Counsel (Oct. 24, 2005), available at http://www.scribd. 
com/doc/22092975/ICE-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-William-J-Howard-10-24-05. 
 82. Id. at 2–3. 
 83. Id. at 8. 
 84. Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforce-
ment, to all ICE Employees 1 (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-
reform/pdf/civil_enforcement_priorities.pdf. 
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discretion consistent with these priorities when conducting enforcement 
operations.”
85
 He further instructed that officers should continue to be 




On June 17, 2011, now-current ICE Director John Morton issued an 
important guidance memorandum to all ICE personnel: “Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforce-
ment Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Re-
moval of Aliens” (the Morton Memo).
87
 The Morton Memo, like its pre-
decessors before it, emphasized the economic necessity of employing 
prosecutorial discretion: 
Because the agency is confronted with more administrative viola-
tions than its resources can address, the agency must regularly exer-
cise ‘prosecutorial discretion’ if it is to prioritize its efforts. In basic 
terms, prosecutorial discretion is the authority of an agency charged 
with enforcing a law to decide to what degree to enforce the law 
against a particular individual. ICE, like any other law enforcement 
agency, has prosecutorial discretion and may exercise it in the ordi-
nary course of enforcement. When ICE favorably exercises prosecu-
torial discretion, it essentially decides not to assert the full scope of 
the enforcement authority available to the agency in a given case.
88
 
With these principles in mind, the Morton Memo specifically out-
lined those agency employees who may exercise prosecutorial discretion 
and what factors those officers should consider when doing so.
89 
Officers 
were directed to review the cases of certain classes of individuals with 
“particular care and consideration,” including those involving veterans, 
long-time residents, childhood arrivals, minors, elderly, pregnant or nurs-
ing women, victims of domestic violence, and individuals with serious 
physical or mental health conditions.
90
 Meanwhile, officers were directed 
                                                          
 85. Id. at 4. 
 86. Id. Morton also instructed officers to continue to follow the November 7, 2007 memoran-
dum from then-Assistant Secretary Julie Myers, which directed all field officers and special agents 
to exercise prosecutorial discretion when making arrest and custody determinations for nursing 
mothers. Id.; see Memorandum from Julie Myers, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, to all Field Office Dirs. and all Special Agents in Charge (Nov. 7, 2007), available at 
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11-7-07. 
 87. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Customs & Immigration Enforcement, to all 
Field Office Dirs., all Special Agents in Charge, and all Chief Counsel (Jun. 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf. 
 88. Id. at 2. 
 89. See generally id. 
 90. Id. at 5 (re-stating factors outlined in the Meissner Memo). 
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to focus their enforcement priority on those cases involving individuals 
who pose a national security risk, those with serious criminal records, 




Prior to DACA, both the Obama and Bush administrations followed 
the prosecutorial discretion guidelines outlined in the various ICE memo-
randa, granting deferred action to some DREAMers.
92
 However, the lack 
of a formal process for handling DREAMer cases led to inconsistent 
practices by different officers and between different field offices nation-
wide.
93
 In April 2011, Assistant Senate Majority Leader Richard Durbin 
(D-IL), Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV), and twenty other 
democratic senators wrote a letter to President Obama, requesting that 
his administration “consider establishing a formal process for applying 
for deferred action and for tracking of DREAM Act cases, to ensure 
more consistent treatment of like cases.”
94
 In essence, the letter requested 
that in the absence of the DREAM Act—or any other legislation—the 
President implement a program very much like DACA.
95
 
In August 2011, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano 
responded to the senators’ letter, announcing DHS’s continued intent that 
low-priority cases at every stage of the removal process be considered 
for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
96
 
The President has said on numerous occasions that it makes no 
sense to expend our enforcement resources on low-priority cases, 
such as individuals like those you reference in your letter, who were 
brought to this country as young children and know no other home. 
From a law enforcement and public safety perspective, DHS en-
forcement resources must continue to be focused on our highest pri-
orities. Doing otherwise hinders our public safety mission—
clogging immigration court dockets and diverting DHS enforcement 
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 92. Letter from Richard Durbin, Assistant Senate Majority Leader, et. al, to President Barack 
Obama (Apr. 13, 2011), available at http://durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID 
=cc76d912-77db-45ca-99a9-624716d9299c. 
 93. Id. 
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She announced that “[t]ogether with the Department of Justice, we 
have initiated an interagency working group to execute a case-by-case 
review of all individuals currently in removal proceedings to ensure that 
they constitute our highest priorities” and that the working group would 
“also initiate a case-by-case review to ensure that new cases placed in 
removal proceedings similarly meet such priorities.” Indeed, following 
her announcement, ICE initiated an “unprecedented review of all immi-
gration cases pending in the immigration courts and incoming cases”
98
 
for consistency with ICE’s removal priorities. Those cases not deemed 
“high-priority” were to be administratively closed.
99
 
On November 17, 2011, ICE followed Napolitano’s August an-
nouncement with a guidance memorandum to all Chief Counsel.
100
 The 
purpose of the memo was to ensure that those cases that were still being 
litigated actually conformed to the priorities set forth in the Morton 
Memo.
101
 However, as Napolitano cautioned in her letter to Senator Dur-
bin, “this process will not alleviate the need for passage of the DREAM 
Act or for larger reforms to our immigration laws.”
102
 She was correct; 
the review was later criticized for being largely ineffective as the number 
of new cases filed far outweighed the slim percentage of cases identified 
as candidates for closure.
103
 Moreover, many of those who were offered 
administrative closure declined to accept it, hoping for greater long-term 
success by a favorable court decision.
104
 Meanwhile, the number of cases 
                                                          
 98. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRESS OFFICE, FACT SHEET: TRANSFORMING THE 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM 1 (2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/ offic-
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 99. Lornet Turnbull, Immigration Courts to Close While ICE Reviews Deportation Cases, 
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 100. Memorandum from Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Customs & Immigra-
tion Enforcement, to all Chief Counsel (Nov. 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/ do-
clib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/case-by-case-review-incoming-certain-pending-cases-memorand 
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 102. Letter from Janet Napolitano, supra note 96, at 2. 
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DISCRETION: A STATISTICAL ASSESSMENT 2–3 (2012) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ASSESSMENT], 
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found eligible under the review fell steadily from 8% at the start of the 
initiative to 3.4% by July 2012.
105
 In fact, “[r]elative to the number of 
immigrants that ordinarily prevail in removal proceedings, the number 
likely to avoid removal as a result of the case-by-case review process is 
comparatively small.”
106
 Additionally, the review was of limited scope; 
by definition, administrative closure applies only to those already in re-
moval proceedings.
107
 The review inherently would not reach the majori-
ty of DREAMers who live in the shadow of deportation but are not actu-
ally in removal proceedings.
108
 
On June 15, 2012, Napolitano formally announced the DACA pro-
gram—yet another step in DHS’s longstanding practice of prosecutorial 
discretion—in a memorandum entitled “Exercising Prosecutorial Discre-
tion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Chil-
dren.”
109
 She directed that “certain young people who were brought to 
the United States through no fault of their own as children, do not present 
a risk to national security or public safety, and meet several key criteria 
will be eligible for relief from removal from the country or from entering 
into removal proceedings.”
110
 Under this memorandum, there are five 
key criteria that must be satisfied before an individual is to be considered 
for an exercise of prosecutorial discretion under DACA: the individual 
(1) came to the United States before the age of sixteen; (2) has continu-
ously resided in the United States for at least five years preceding June 
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15, 2012, and was present in the United States on June 15, 2012; (3) is 
currently in school, has graduated from high school, has obtained a GED, 
or is an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed 
Forces of the United States; (4) has not been convicted of a felony, a sig-
nificant misdemeanor, multiple misdemeanors, or otherwise poses a 
threat to national security or public safety; and (5) is not above the age of 
thirty.
111
 That same day, Morton issued a memorandum instructing all 
ICE agents and personnel to immediately begin exercising prosecutorial 
discretion in a manner consistent with DACA.
112
 
III. THE BACKGROUND AND LEGALITIES OF DACA 
This section analyzes the legalities of DACA as a form of prosecu-
torial discretion. Part III.A briefly discusses the DREAM Act, establish-
ing a background to the development of DACA. Part III.B explores the 
legalities of DACA through the lens of specific criticisms of the pro-
gram. Part III.C evaluates why an affirmative grant of employment au-
thorization is within the scope of the Executive Branch’s authority to 
exercise prosecutorial discretion. 
A. The DREAM Act 
The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act is a 
bipartisan federal bill originally introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-
UT) and Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) that would, if passed, legalize 
the status of millions of eligible undocumented youth.
113
 It has been pro-
posed in Congress in various forms at least twenty-four times.
114
 Alt-
hough the details of its specific components have varied over the years, 
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its core requirements have remained fairly consistent.
 115
 A 2011 version 
required that the DREAMer had arrived in the United States before the 
age of fifteen; been present in the United States for five years prior to 
passage of the bill; been a person of good moral character and have a 
clean record; have obtained a GED or high school diploma or has been 
admitted to an institution of higher learning; and be thirty-five years of 
age or younger on the date of enactment.
116
 A DREAMer who met these 
requirements would receive permanent residence on a conditional basis 
for six years, during which time they must have completed at least two 
years in a bachelor’s or higher degree program or served in the military 
for at least two years, and after which point they could apply to have the 
conditions removed and be left with permanent resident status.
117
 
In 2007, “the unlikely trio of John McCain, Ted Kennedy, and Pres-
ident Bush came together to champion [the Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform Act],”
118
 which contained the entirety of the DREAM Act.
119
 
However, it came eight votes short from earning the sixty votes needed 
to break a Republican filibuster. In 2010, the DREAM Act passed the 
House of Representatives and received a bipartisan majority vote in the 




In a speech from the Rose Garden on June 15, 2012, President 
Obama personally announced his administration’s new immigration poli-
cy,
121
 emphasizing the public policy rationale behind his plan to “mend 
our nation’s immigration policy, to make it more fair, more efficient, and 




These are young people who study in our schools, they play in 
our neighborhoods, they’re friends with our kids, they pledge alle-
giance to our flag. They are Americans in their heart, in their minds, 
in every single way but one: on paper. They were brought to this 
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country by their parents—sometimes even as infants— and often 
have no idea that they’re undocumented until they apply for a job or 
a driver’s license, or a college scholarship.  
[I]t makes no sense to expel talented young people, who, for all 
intents and purposes, are Americans—they’ve been raised as Amer-
icans; understand themselves to be part of this country—to expel 
these young people who want to staff our labs, or start new busi-
nesses, or defend our country simply because of the actions of their 
parents—or because of the inaction of politicians.  
Effective immediately, the Department of Homeland Security is 
taking steps to lift the shadow of deportation from these young peo-
ple.  
[T]his is not amnesty, this is not immunity. This is not a path to 
citizenship. It’s not a permanent fix. This is a temporary stopgap 
measure that lets us focus our resources wisely while giving a de-
gree of relief and hope to talented, driven, patriotic young people. It 
is the right thing to do.
 123
 
Between June 15, 2012, and August 15, 2012, the new policy was 
immediately implemented in both pending removal proceedings and by 
ICE officers in the field. On August 15, 2012, USCIS began accepting 
applications affirmatively filed by DREAMers requesting consideration 
of deferred action under DACA.
124
 
C. The Executive Authority to Implement DACA and Grant Employment 
Authorization As a Form of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Many critiques of the DACA program can be summarized by ad-
dressing the arguments raised by ten ICE officers, who in August 2012 
filed a lawsuit in federal court to block the program.
125
 The officers 
claimed that DACA violates the INA and “transgresses our constitutional 
separation of powers.
126
 They argued that “virtually every time an ICE 
agent encounters unauthorized aliens, he or she has a duty under federal 
law—with which no supervisor can interfere—to place the aliens into 
formal removal proceedings.”
127
 The following subsections will address 
these arguments. 
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1. DACA Is Within Federal Statutory Limits 
The officers
128
 (Crane plaintiffs) argue that the IIRIRA eliminated 
prosecutorial discretion when ICE officers have become aware of a per-
son’s undocumented status
129
 and it is therefore outside the authority of 
the Executive Branch to issue deferred action as a form of prosecutorial 
discretion. Their argument is based on a strict interpretation of the post-
IIRIRA INA, which they contend directs—by the use of a mandatory 
“shall”—that immigration officers must arrest anyone they determine is 
present without having been admitted: 
[A]n alien present in the United States who has not been admit-
ted . . . shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for 
admission
130
 . . . [which requires that the alien] shall be inspected 
by immigration officers,
131
 . . . [and] if the examining immigration 
officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and 
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained 
for a [removal] proceeding [in immigration court].
132
 
This interpretation is seriously flawed for several reasons. First, 
while the provisions cited by the Crane plaintiffs are indeed within the 
INA, as Professor David A. Martin explains, they are inaccurately pre-
sented as if they apply across the board.
133
 Second, while the “alien pre-
sent in the United States who has not been admitted”
134
 likely represents 
the stereotypical “illegal alien” that the general public envisions, “by 
commonly accepted estimates [this population] make[s] up only fifty to 
sixty-seven percent of the unlawfully present population.”
135
 All others 
have been admitted legally as temporary visitors and then either over-
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stayed or otherwise violated their visa conditions.
136
 Simply put, this 
statutory provision is irrelevant to as many as half of the removable per-
sons encountered by ICE agents, “and there is no reason to think that 
different percentages would apply to DACA applicants.”
137
 
Regarding those persons to whom the cited provisions do apply, the 
Crane plaintiffs’ argument is still illegitimate. In 2000, the Board of Im-
migration Appeals (BIA)
138
 found that subsequent to IIRIRA, the INS 
did in fact retain prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to com-
mence removal proceedings against a person.
139
 Professor Stephen Yale-
Loehr explained that the purpose of IIRIRA was to restrict judicial re-
view, not to restrict agency discretion: “[IIRIRA] focused on restricting 
the ability of federal courts to overturn immigration agency decisions—it 
did not address the rule of the executive branch on this particular is-
sue . . . . The action today [DACA] simply extended prosecutorial discre-
tion policy that had already been in place.”
140
 
As Doris Meissner clearly addressed in her 2000 Meissner Memo, 
“[l]ike all law enforcement agencies, the [DHS] has finite resources, and 
it is not possible to investigate and prosecute all immigration viola-
tions.”
141
 Meissner advised, “[a]s a law enforcement agency, the INS 
generally has prosecutorial discretion within its area of law enforcement 
unless that discretion has been clearly limited by statute in a way that 
goes beyond standard terminology.”
142
 Recently, the BIA ruled that the 
word “shall” does not carry the ordinary meaning of an act that is manda-
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Ashcroft “issued a controversial rule similarly aimed at the backlog . . . [which] substantially ex-
panded the use of both single-member decisions and affirmances without reasoned opinions.” Id. at 
745. “A Los Angeles Times investigation reported that some BIA members acknowledge deciding 
up to 50 cases a day.” Id. These procedures have come under appropriately harsh attack for seriously 
diminishing the quality of the already-limited review process, but are outside the scope of this 
Comment. 
 139. KENNEY, supra note 44 (citing Bahta, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1381 (BIA 2000)). 
 140. De Vogue, supra note 129; see also the discussion regarding IIRIRA, supra Part II.C.1. 
 141. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 78, at 4. 
 142. Id.at 3 (emphasis added).  
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tory.
143
 In fact, “it is common for the term ‘shall’ to mean ‘may’ when it 
relates to decisions made by the Executive Branch of the Government on 
whether to charge an individual and on what charge or charges to 
bring.”
144
 Because of this ambiguity, if Congress truly wanted to limit 
prosecutorial discretion, it would need to make its intent patently clear in 
a way that the Meissner Memo directs—by using language that goes be-
yond standard terminology. Criminal statutes frequently make use of the 
word “shall,” and no one rationally expects that police officers will make 
an arrest in every case or that prosecutors will follow through with a 
charge in every case,
145
 as discussed in Part II.B. Similarly, it is entirely 
unrealistic to expect immigration officers to pursue a removal in every 
case.
146
 “[A]s long as the same constitutionally based discretion that the 
executive branch possesses in the criminal realm also applies to immigra-
tion enforcement—as the BIA and the Supreme Court have indicated—
then discretion continues, and it belongs . . . to the President and his del-
egates who head the relevant agency.”
147
 The constitutional foundation 
for this authority is discussed below. 
2. DACA Is Constitutional 
There are two common arguments made by critics, such as the 
Crane plaintiffs, when asserting that the DACA program is unconstitu-
tional. The first argument is that by not enforcing removal against re-
movable persons, the President is violating his Article II, section three 
obligation to enforce the law.
148
 The second argument is that the Execu-




Regarding the first argument, acts are properly within the Executive 
authority when “an official interprets an enacted law and exercises judg-
                                                          
 143. Martin, supra note 21, at 182 (citing E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 520, 522 (BIA 
2011), where the provision at issue was INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Martin, supra note 21, at 182 (“A typical petty larceny statute reads: ‘Whoever 
steals . . . the property of another [worth less than $250] . . . shall be guilty of larceny, and . . . shall 
be punished by imprisonment’ for not more than a year or a $300 fine.”). 
 146. Id. The financial impossibility of enforcing every possible removal is discussed in Part 
III.C.2, infra. 
 147. Martin, supra note 21, at 183. 
 148. Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution requires that the President, by and 
through his Executive Branch officials, “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 3; De Vogue, supra note 129. 
 149. Article I, Section 1 of the United States Constitution provides that “All legislative Powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and 
House of Representatives.” U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 1; De Vogue, supra note 129. 
2013] The American DREAM 243 
ment ‘concerning facts that affect the application of [that law].’”
150
 The 
President has done just that through DACA. As previously discussed, the 
President simply cannot enforce the removal of eleven million people, 
even if he wanted to. Apprehending, detaining, and removing the entire 
undocumented population residing in our nation today would require an 
ICE budget of $135 billion; an impossible feat when “[c]urrently and for 
the next fiscal year, ICE’s appropriation will run under $6 billion.”
151
 
Moreover, with ICE’s annual removal quota of 400,000 persons a 
year,
152
 it would take nearly thirty years to affect such a plan, assuming 
the undocumented population remains unchanged. By implementing 
DACA, the President is exercising his judgment concerning the facts that 
affect the application of the immigration laws Congress has enacted, en-
forcing those laws by efficiently focusing our limited removal resources 
on those who truly pose a threat: 
In the absence of any immigration action from Congress to fix our 
broken immigration system, what we’ve tried to do is focus our im-
migration enforcement resources in the right places . . . . We fo-
cused and used discretion about whom to prosecute, focusing on 
criminals who endanger our communities rather than students who 
are earning their education . . . . We’ve improved on that discretion 
carefully and thoughtfully. Well, today, we’re improving it 
again . . . . Over the next few months, eligible individuals who do 
not present a risk to national security or public safety will be able to 




A response to the second argument is simple and obvious—DACA 
is not a legislative act. Legislative acts “[have] the purpose and effect of 
altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . outside the 
                                                          
 150. Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is to Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statu-
tory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 865 & n.192 (2009) (citing 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986)) (“[T]he executive branch must be exercising . . . crea-
tivity, judgment, or discretion in an ‘implementational’ context. In other words, the executive branch 
must be interpreting or enforcing a legislative choice or judgment; its actions cannot amount to the 
exercise of free-standing legislative power.” (quoting Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If 
Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 
DUKE L. REV. 449, 480 (1991))). 
 151. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 136, at 788 (citing WILLIAM L. PAINTER, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42557, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS: A SUMMARY OF THE HOUSE-
PASSED AND SENATE-REPORTED BILLS FOR FY 2013 at 6 (2012)). 
 152. See generally Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 136, at 788. 
 153. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration, supra note 16 (em-
phasis added). 
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Legislative Branch.”
154
 DACA does not alter the legal rights, duties, or 
relations of those eligible under the program; it does not confer legal sta-
tus on any person that he or she did not have before.
155
 It simply declines 
to enforce removal against those individuals for a period of two years.
156
 
It is an agency’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion with respect to how 
to spend its resources, as has been done many times before.
157
 It is, “to a 
great extent, old wine in a new wineskin.”
158
 
“Though no statutes or regulations delineate deferred action in spe-
cific terms, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that decision to initi-
ate or terminate enforcement proceedings fall squarely with the authority 
of the Executive.”
159
 Congress has similarly recognized this authority. In 
November 1999, twenty-eight members of Congress signed a bipartisan 
letter requesting that the Attorney General and Commissioner of the INS 
exercise discretion in immigration cases.
160
 The letter stated “there has 
been widespread agreement that some deportations were unfair and re-
sulted in unjustifiable hardships . . . we must ask why the INS has pur-
sued removal in such cases when so many other more serious cases ex-
isted . . . The principle of prosecutorial discretion is well established.”
161
 
The formalized nature of the DACA program ensures greater consistency 
and compliance agency-wide in its dealings with DREAMers, an element 
lacking in earlier prosecutorial discretion efforts.
162
 
On June 25, 2012, the Court in Arizona v. United States embraced 
and re-affirmed the Executive Branch’s authority to exercise prosecutori-
al discretion at all stages of removal, including the initial decision of 
whether to even pursue removal.
163
 Writing for the majority, Justice 
                                                          
 154. Jellum, supra note 150, at 862 (citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (holding that the legislative veto was “essentially legislative” in nature)). 
 155. See Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
http://www.dhs.gov/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals (last visited Aug. 29, 2013). Employment 
authorization will be discussed in Part III.C.3, infra. 
 156. This period is potentially renewable. Martin, supra note 21. 
 157. See generally IMMIGRATION POL’Y CENTER, UNDERSTANDING PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION, supra note 77. 
 158. Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the 
Vexing Case(s) of Dream Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 463, 542 (2012). 
 159. Letter from Hiroshi Motomura, et al., to President Barack Obama (May 28, 2012), availa-
ble at www.nilc.org/document.html?id=754. 
 160. Letter from 28 Members of Cong. to Attorney Gen. Janet Reno & Doris Meissner, 
Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. (Nov. 4, 1999), reprinted in 76 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 1720 app. 1 (1999). 
 161. IMMIGRATION POL’Y CENTER, UNDERSTANDING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION, supra 
note 77, at 5.  
 162. See supra text accompanying note 99. 
 163. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2495 (2012). 
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Kennedy declared that “removal is a civil matter, and one of its principal 
features is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials, who 
must decide whether to pursue removal at all.”
164
 The Court recognized 
the practical need for prosecutorial discretion in a world of limited re-
sources where it is simply impossible to remove every removable person: 
“The Executive Branch’s ability to exercise discretion and set priorities 
is particularly important because of the need to allocate scarce enforce-
ment resources wisely.”
165
 In remarking on the Court’s decision, Presi-
dent Obama reiterated that DACA is not new law but rather, an agency 
enforcement of current law in line with current priorities: “We will con-




Some argue that granting eligibility for employment authorization 
to DACA recipients is a benefit that crosses the line into legislation and 
is outside the scope of prosecutorial discretion. This important argument 
is addressed below. 
3. Employment Authorization Is Within the Scope of                         
Prosecutorial Discretion 
a. A Natural Consequence 
If it is within the authority of the Executive Branch to grant de-
ferred action as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, it must also be 
within its authority to affirmatively grant eligibility for employment au-
thorization. The Crane plaintiffs and other DACA critics argue that em-
ployment authorization is an immigration benefit for which eligibility 
cannot be conferred as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.
167
 But with-
out the authority to work legally, how are those who have been granted 
relief from deportation expected to support themselves and contribute to 
their communities in any meaningful way? This is an important question 
because it addresses not only the DACA population, but all persons re-
lieved from deportation as a form of prosecutorial discretion both today 
and in the future. Long after the day when comprehensive immigration 
reform is finally passed, removals will continue and prosecutorial discre-
                                                          
 164. Id. (emphasis added). 
 165. Id. at 2520. 
 166. Statement by the President on the Supreme Court’s Ruling on Arizona v. the United States 
(June 25, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/25/statement-
president-supreme-court-s-ruling-arizona-v-united-states (emphasis added). 
 167. Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247-0, 2012 WL 5199509, at *10, *17 (N.D. Tex. 
Oct. 10, 2012); 8 § C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14) (2011). 
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tion will remain—and with it will remain the question of employment 
authorization. 
While technically it is not a crime to work without employment au-
thorization, under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
(IRCA), harsh and lasting civil sanctions are imposed on those who 
do.
168
 “Aliens who accept unlawful employment are not eligible to have 
their status adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident,”
169
 and “may 
be removed from the country for having engaged in unauthorized 
work.”
170
 Additionally, “federal law makes it a crime for unauthorized 
workers to obtain employment through fraudulent means,”
171
 such as 
using a false social security number. Thus, undocumented persons face 
frightening choices: (1) do not work at all and try to survive—not to 
mention support a family—without a source of income; (2) work without 
documentation, creating further immigration difficulties down the road 
and potentially exposing yourself to unscrupulous employers who may 
take advantage of your undocumented status;
172
 or (3) work with false 
documentation and break federal law. An undocumented person who is 
ineligible for relief of any kind may still decide that any one of these op-
tions is preferable to a life in their home country—assuming they even 
have a home country. It is difficult to fault them for this decision when 
“economic realities and government policies shape the apparently free 
choices of individuals much more profoundly than the superficial con-
tours of the law as written.”
173
 However, if the government in its discre-
tion has affirmatively chosen not to enforce removal against an individu-
al, it is against public policy—not to mention human decency—to bid 
that individual good luck and leave her without a legal means to support 
herself, still facing the same impossible dilemma. 
In Zadvydas v. Davis,
174
 the Court considered this dilemma in the 
context of slightly different circumstances, determining how to proceed 
                                                          
 168. Congress enacted IRCA as a comprehensive framework for “combating the employment 
of illegal aliens.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504 (citing Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 
535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002)). 
 169. See Immigration and Naturalization Act, § 245(c)(2) (2008); Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504. 
 170. See INA § 237(a)(1)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R § 214.1(e); Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504. 
 171. See 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b) (2002); Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504. 
 172. There are countless stories of employers who hire undocumented workers only to call ICE 
and have them detained on payday. E.g., Maurice Belanger, Workplace Enforcement: A Welcome 
Shift in Focus, NAT’L IMMIGR. FORUM (May 6, 2011), http://immigrationforum.org/blog/display 
/workplace-enforcement-a-welcome-shift-in-focus. 
 173. See generally, Hiroshi Motomura, Making Legal: The Dream Act, Birthright Citizenship, 
and Broad-Scale Legalization, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1127, 1140 (2012) (noting that even the 
Supreme Court has recognized this point). 
 174. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
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when a person has been detained and ordered removed but circumstances 
make it essentially impossible to remove the person due to circumstances 
with his home country.
175
 Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer de-
clared it unconstitutional to detain a person indefinitely when there is no 
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably near future and that 
such persons must therefore be released, albeit without legal status.
176
 
Justice Kennedy noted that “Congress . . . was well aware of the difficul-
ties confronting aliens who are removable but who cannot be repatriated. 
It made special provisions allowing them to be employed, a privilege 
denied to other deportable aliens.”
177
 These provisions provide that “no 
alien ordered removed shall be eligible to receive authorization to be 
employed in the United States unless the Attorney General makes a spe-
cific finding that . . . the removal of the alien is otherwise impracticable 
or contrary to the public interest.”
178
 Indeed, in the context of DACA, a 
favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion is simply a finding that re-
moval of the noncitizen is contrary to the public interest (based on the 
priorities that were clearly set forth in the ICE memorandum). It is im-
portant to note that while the provisions applied in Zadvydas relate spe-
cifically to noncitizens that have already been ordered removed and are 
in detention—which may include some DACA recipients—there are 
many DACA recipients who affirmatively apply for the program without 
ever undergoing removal proceedings. It would be inconsistent and arbi-
trary to deny those without a final order of removal the eligibility to 
work; this is especially true with DACA recipients who are great candi-
dates for employment with a U.S. education and a clean criminal history. 
In fact, Congress has provided eligibility for employment authori-
zation for many different classes of noncitizens who are granted relief 
from deportation. Persons granted relief under Cancellation of Remov-
al,
179
 Withholding of Removal,
180
 Deferred Enforced Depar-
                                                          
 175. Zadvydas dealt with the cases of two detained individuals, Kestutis Zadvydas and Kim Ho 
Ma. Id. at 684. In the case of Zadvydas, removal was impossible because he was born in a displaced 
persons camp, and there was no home country to remove him to. Id. at 684–85. In the case of Ma, 
removal was impossible due to the lack of a repatriation agreement with his home country. Id. at 
686. 
 176. Id. at 701 (establishing that after a six-month period, “once the alien provides good reason 
to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the 
Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing”; otherwise, they must 
release the individual.). 
 177. Id. at 709 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also INA § 241(a)(7)(A) (2006) (providing that 
an “alien [who] cannot be removed due to the refusal of all countries designated by the alien or 
under this section to receive the alien” still remains eligible for employment in the United States).  
 178. INA § 241(a)(7)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 179. INA § 240A (2006). 





 and Violence 
Against Women Act self-petitioners
183
 placed in deferred action are all 
eligible to apply for employment authorization.
184
 Employment authori-
zation is, quite simply, a very practical consequence of the government’s 
decision to relieve a person from deportation but not to confer a legalized 
status. To construe otherwise would be inconsistent with Congress’s 
clear intent that these populations be extended the necessary authoriza-
tion to support themselves
185
—evidenced through the grant of employ-
ment authorization in INA’s numerous relief provisions described above. 
Additionally, there are other provisions of the INA that expressly seek to 
avoid government financial support of noncitizens, such as the public 
charge inadmissibility and removal grounds
186
 and affidavit of support 
requirements for intending immigrants.
187
 Finally, the federal regulations 
very clearly state that “classes of aliens authorized to accept employment 
include aliens who have been granted deferred action.”
188
 There is no 
question that DACA recipients have been granted deferred action as a 
form of relief from deportation, and so they are therefore appropriately 
among those classes authorized to accept employment. 
b. Employment Authorization and Equal Protection 
DACA’s June 15, 2011 birthdate fortuitously occurred on the thirti-
eth anniversary of the pivotal Supreme Court case Plyler v. Doe,
189
 
which declared that in addition to due process, undocumented persons 
are also entitled to equal protection under the Constitution.
190
 
Given the many instances where Congress extends eligibility for 
employment authorization to those populations who are granted relief 
from deportation but not lawful status,
191
 it is only natural that when the 
                                                                                                                                  
 180. INA § 241(b)(3) (2006). 
 181. INA § 244 (repealed 2004). 
 182. INA § 212(d)(5) (2013). 
 183. INA § 240(a)(2) (2006); Battered Spouse, Children & Parents, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGR. SERV., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6 
d1a/?vgnextoid=b85c3e4d77d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=b85c3e4d77
d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last visited Aug. 20, 2013). 
 184. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2011). 
 185. See sources cited supra at notes 179–84. 
 186. INA §§ 212(a)(4) (2013), 237 (2008). 
 187. INA § 213A (1996). 
 188. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2011). 
 189. 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see also Olivas, supra note 158, at 542. 
 190. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215 (holding “[t]hat a person’s initial entry into . . . the United States, 
was unlawful . . . cannot negate the simple fact of his presence . . . . Given such presence . . . he is 
entitled to the equal protection of the laws”). 
 191. See sources cited supra notes 179–84. 
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Executive Branch creates a similar population through a lawful exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion, it too should be free to grant employment 
authorization to that population as a natural extension of its authority. To 
deny a population that opportunity simply because their relief was pro-
vided by the Executive Branch rather than the Legislative Branch is ar-
guably inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause, which directs that 
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.
192
 
While Plyler specifically dealt with the public education of undoc-
umented children—the Court held that a state may not deny a discrete 
group of (undocumented) children the free public education it offers to 
others in the state
193
—the case is rich with public policy rationale that 
closely parallels that at play behind DACA and the DREAM Act.
194
 It 
also supports the idea that employment authorization is a natural and 
necessary extension to prosecutorial discretion. 
Plyler recognized that “by depriving the children of any disfavored 
group of an education, we foreclose the means by which that group 
might raise the level of esteem in which it is held by the majority. But 
more directly, ‘education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-
sufficient participants in society.’”
195
 Similarly, to offer a person relief 
from deportation while at the same time deny her employment authoriza-
tion would also foreclose her ability to “rise to the level of esteem which 
is held by the majority,” as well as her ability to become “self-reliant and 
self-sufficient participants in society”—that is, to support herself and her 
family, and be a productive and active member of the economy. To make 
such a denial to DACA recipients (or other similar populations) while 
Congress has granted the opportunity to similarly situated classes of in-
dividuals offered relief from deportation
196
 would not comport with equal 
protection.  
In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan urged that “education pro-
vides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically pro-
ductive lives to the benefit of us all.”
197
 It could similarly be said that 
legal employment is also a basic tool “by which individuals might lead 
                                                          
 192. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.”); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216. 
 193. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (requiring such a denial to be justified by a substantial state inter-
est). 
 194. See generally Motomura, supra note 173, at 1129 (“[T]he Plyler themes are pivotal in 
thinking about vehicles for conferring lawful status, including the DREAM Act, birthright citizen-
ship, and broad-scale legalization.”). 
 195. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221–22 (citation omitted). 
 196. See sources cited supra at notes 179–184. 
 197. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221. 
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economically productive lives to the benefit of us all.” Justice Brennan 
went on to advise that “education has a fundamental role in maintaining 
the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs 
borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb 
the values and skills upon which our social order rests.”
198
 In very much 
the same way that education holds such “a fundamental role in maintain-
ing the fabric of our society,” so too does employment. Indeed, one of 
the major reasons behind education at any level is to prepare a person for 
employment. If it is within the authority of the Executive Branch to exer-
cise prosecutorial discretion in order to provide relief from deportation, 
then as a matter of public policy and equal protection it must also be 
within that same authority to extend eligibility for employment authori-
zation. 
IV. DACA AND COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM 
This section primarily addresses comprehensive immigration re-
form; it explores the need for system-wide reform, what that reform 
might look like, and where DACA fits into it all. 
As the numbers plainly indicate,
199
 our immigration system has 
produced a nightmare that only drastic reform consistent with today’s 
social, economic, and enforcement priorities can hope to remedy. DACA 
is a great start, but it is a temporary measure and by no means a replace-
ment for comprehensive immigration reform. In a sense, DACA is acting 
as a stand-in for eligible DREAMers until comprehensive immigration 
form is finally passed.
200
 While DACA’s immense value to DREAMers 
cannot be understated, it is not a permanent solution. Rather, the program 
can be likened to a life-preserver, helping DREAMers tread water until 
the Legislature finally decides to change the law in a way that will secure 
them something better—a lifeboat, or even land (legalization or citizen-
ship). Furthermore, DACA only reaches a fraction of the undocumented 
population
201
 and it does not confer legal status—not to mention provide 
a path to citizenship.
202
 And because it is not law, the program can disap-
pear at any time.
203
 
                                                          
 198. Id. 
 199. See supra text accompanying notes 151–152. 
 200. Many thanks to Professor Won Kidane for suggesting a discussion on this point. 
 201. See Passel & Lopez, supra note 15 (estimating 1.7 million individuals could be eligible 
for DACA). 
 202. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration, supra note 16. 
 203. Jon Leckie, Oakland’s Undocumented Students Find Temporary Hope in DACA, Califor-
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In order to be effective, reform must address not only DACA stu-
dents and DREAMers, but all of the eleven million-plus undocumented 
persons present in the United States.
204
 And it can’t stop there—to make 
a real impact, reform will also need to address the more than 4.5 million 
individuals living abroad who have been sponsored by a family member 
in the United States and whose visas have been approved but are not yet 
available due to numerical caps.
205
 The backlog of these individuals is 
staggering: As of September 2013, a Filipino whose visa was sponsored 
by a United States citizen sibling and was approved in 1990 will just now 
receive that visa; a United States citizen who in 1993 sponsored their 




With these figures in mind, some argue that DREAMers are being 
given preferential treatment, moving ahead of their hardworking parents 
who risked everything to bring them here
207
 as well as the backlog of 
individuals waiting “in line” for their visas to become available.
208
 In-
deed, when advocating for reform, “[t]he temptation is strong—perhaps 
irresistible—to emphasize the innocence of children brought to the Unit-
ed States at a young age. And the temptation is equally strong to cite the 
many examples of young people who have excelled academically.”
209
 I 
myself succumbed to this temptation when introducing this Comment. 
“Viewed more fundamentally, however, the fairness and pragmatic ar-
guments apply to all children, not just the honor students, and they apply 
                                                          
 204. See MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRATION POPULATION RESIDING IN THE 
UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2011, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets 
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 206. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Immigrant Numbers for September 2013, 
VISA BULL., Sept. 2013, at 2, available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/visabulletin/visabulletin 
_september2013.pdf. 
 207. Ruben Navarette, DREAMers Are Pushing Their Luck, CNN OPINION (Dec. 19, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/19/opinion/navarette-dreamers (“While they probably don’t realize it, 
their public tantrums are turning people against them and hurting the chances for a broader immigra-
tion reform package. And if they set back that cause, heaven help them. They’ll sink the progress for 
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their undocumented parents. You know, the people who brought them to this country in the first 
place for a better life, and then fed them, clothed them and sheltered them.”). 
 208. See supra text accompanying notes 206–207. 
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to adults as well.”
210
 To really make a lasting change, reform will need to 
address everyone—all undocumented persons living in the United States 
in addition to the backlog of millions waiting abroad for their visas. 
In his 2013 State of the Union Address, President Obama recog-
nized that comprehensive immigration reform does not end with the un-
documented population, insisting that “real reform means fixing the legal 
immigration system to cut waiting periods.”
211
 He also outlined his vi-
sion for comprehensive immigration reform: “Real reform means strong 
border security . . . . Real reform means establishing a responsible path-
way to earned citizenship—a path that includes passing a background 
check, paying taxes and a meaningful penalty, learning English, and go-
ing to the back of the line behind the folks trying to come here legal-
ly.”
212
 Recent legislative proposals have shared similar elements.
213
 
Since the 2012 Presidential election and Mitt Romney’s failure at 
the polls with Latino voters—who make up ten percent of the elec-
torate
214
—it appears that the atmosphere amongst Republicans regarding 
immigration reform has shifted from the days of DREAM Act filibus-
ters.
215
 Senator Lindsay Graham (R-SC) expressed the party’s very prac-
tical rationale: “[Latino voters are] the fastest-growing demographic in 
the country and we’re losing votes every election cycle, it has to 
stop . . . . It’s one thing to shoot yourself in the foot—just don’t reload 
the gun.”
216
 Furthermore, Senator Chuck Schumer (R-NY) recognized 
that “[t]he Republican Party has learned that being . . . anti-immigrant 
doesn’t work for them politically. And they know it.”
217
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Now that both parties seem to finally agree that reform is a must, 
the disagreement lies in the details. Many advocate for legalization and a 
pathway to citizenship for the entire undocumented population; others 
want to reserve citizenship for DREAMers and limit all others to simple 
legalization.
218
 However, the fact that we are disagreeing over how rather 
than whether to implement reform confirms that the underlying effort has 
truly gained full bipartisan support. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Prosecutorial discretion has long been recognized as a legitimate 
and necessary authority exercised by law enforcement and government 
agencies when deciding whether to bring charges against a person; it is a 
decision generally not reviewable by the judiciary. Within the immigra-
tion context, “deferred action is a long standing form of administrative 
relief used by presidents of both parties over many years.”
219
 It is used 
when deciding whether to pursue removal against a person, based in 
large part on the government’s enforcement priorities. 
DACA was established by the President as a method of formally 
and consistently enforcing our nation’s immigration laws in a way that 
focuses ICE’s limited removal resources on criminals instead of hard-
working students, reflecting the agency’s long-held priorities. Both Con-
gress and the U.S. Supreme Court have recognized prosecutorial discre-
tion as an Executive Branch authority, valid both statutorily and under 
the Constitution. DACA, including the attendant grant of employment 
authorization, is well within that authority. 
While “[i]t remains to be seen whether the rules for [DACA] will 
carry over into legislative proposals,”
220
 the program will surely have 
lasting influence as a defining and important step along the way to com-
prehensive immigration reform. It has changed many lives, revived the 
immigration debate, and paved the way for future reform. 
We didn’t raise the Statue of Liberty with its back to the world. We 
raised it with its light to the world. What makes us American is not 
a question of what we look like or what our names are. What makes 
us American is our shared belief in the enduring promise of this 
country—and our shared responsibility to leave it more generous 
and more hopeful than we found it. 
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